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Abstract
Using the representation introduced in [1], an artificial game in quantum strat-
egy space is proposed and studied. Although it has well-known classical corre-
spondence, which has classical mixture strategy Nash Equilibrium states, the equi-
librium state of this quantum game is an entangled strategy (operator) state of
the two players. By discovering such behavior, it partially shows the independent
meaning of the new representation. The idea of entanglement of strategies, instead
of quantum states, is proposed, and in some sense, such entangled strategy state
can be regarded as a cooperative behavior between game players.
Key Words: Game Theory, Quantum Game Theory, Entanglement
Pacs: 02.50.Le, 03.67.-a, 03.65.Ud
Introduction — Recently, we proposed a new mathematical representation for Clas-
sical and Quantum Game Theory[1]. The idea is to define base vectors in strategy space
and their inner product so as to form them as a Hilbert space. Then a system state is
a vector in the direct product space of all single-player state spaces. A density matrix
is used to describe a system state in this space. And then the payoff functions are reex-
pressed as hermitian operators acting on this system Hilbert space. Every player has a
payoff matrix, which is a (1, 1)-tensor no matter how many players and how many base
strategies the game has. In that paper, many open questions were pointed out. Most
of those questions can only be discussed in the new representation. If the conclusions
of such questions shows some new phenomena, the special value of the new represen-
tation will partially be confirmed. One of such questions is the meaning of entangled
strategies, which will happen when the direct product relation between system density
matrix and single-player density matrix is destroyed. In this paper, we try to answer
this question by one example. On the other hand, according to [2], a comment on quan-
tum game, two questions should be answered for any quantum version of classical game.
First, whether it is helpful to solve the original classical game; second, is a new truly
quantum game, or still in the scope of classical game. In [5], we give a detailed answer
of those two questions, while here, we try to provide a positive answer by this example.
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The conclusion in this paper implies that from the viewpoint of classical game, besides
an equivalent description, our new representation provides an applicable algorithm and
even the process of the algorithm can be regarded as a reasonable evolutionary process,
and it could be a way from static non-cooperative game to cooperative game; from
the viewpoint of quantum game, the game in our representation is totally a new game,
which could never be putted into the framework of classical game, because a classical
payoff matrix Gi is not enough to describe all information of a quantum game, which
requires a much larger matrix H i.
The new representation — First, let’s shortly review the new representation. A
game is defined as
Γ =
(
N∏
i
(
×Si,q
)
,
N∏
i
(
×Si,c
)
,
{
H i
})
. (1)
in which Si,q has base vectors
{∣∣∣si,qµ 〉}, and Sci has base vectors {∣∣∣si,cν 〉}. Usually the
later is a subset of the former, but not necessary. A classical payoff function is defined
on system base vectors such as H i,c =
∑
S |S〉H
i,c
SS 〈S|, while a quantum payoff function
is defined as H i =
∑
SS
′
∣∣∣S 〉H i
SS
′
〈
S
′
∣∣∣, which has non-zero off-diagonal elements while
H i,c has only diagonal terms. H i is hermitian and may have different forms for each
player. A system state is defined as
ρs =
N∏
i
ρi. (2)
The payoff of player i under a system state ρs is
Ei (ρs) = Tr
(
ρsH i
)
. (3)
A reduced payoff matrix of player i, which player i uses as a evaluation of all his own
strategies under the fixed strategies of all other players, is defined as
H iR = Tri(ρ
1 · · · ρi−1ρi+1 · · · ρNH i), (4)
where Tri (·) means to do the trace in the space except the one of player i. Then from
equ(3), the payoff of player i also can be calculated by
Ei (ρs) = Tri
(
ρiH iR
)
, (5)
in which Tri (·) is the trace in player i’s space. An equilibrium state is defined
Ei
(
ρseq
)
≥ Ei
(
ρ1eq · · · ρ
i · · · ρNeq
)
,∀i. (6)
This definition uses the same idea as Nash Equilibrium, but has independent mean-
ing. First because the density matrix form allows more strategies than the traditional
mixture strategy, and second, because ρseq might be an entangled strategy state, which
destroys equ(2), while this is not allowed in both traditional classical and quantum
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game. When such an entangled state is allowed, we need to adjust a little of equ(6),
because at that case, ρjeq is not pre-defined. Here we try to define them as reduced
density matrix,
Ei
(
ρseq
)
≥ Ei
(
Tri
(
ρseq
)
· ρi
)
,∀i. (7)
It should be noticed that when equ(2) holds, the new definition equ(7) is equivalent
with equ(6). A special case of the above definition is
Ei
(
ρseq
)
≥ Ei (ρs) ,∀ρs,∀i. (8)
Although is not always possible to find such a state ρseq, in this paper, we will ‘produce’
a game to make use of such states. Later on, we name such equilibrium as Global
Equilibrium State (GES).
The artificial game —Now we define our 2-player game on base vector set {|B〉 , |S〉},
which means Box and Show respectively. We use them as base vectors for both classical
and quantum game. So the base vectors of system space are {|BB〉 , |BS〉 , |SB〉 , |SS〉}.
An arbitrary system state can be
ρs = ρµν |µ〉 〈ν| , (9)
where µ, ν is anyone of the base vectors. Now we just write down the artificial payoff
matrix,
H1 =


ǫ1 0 0 ǫ1
0 ǫ2 ǫ2 0
0 ǫ2 ǫ2 0
ǫ1 0 0 ǫ1

 = H2, (10)
which does not come from a real quantum game at this stage. But now we will try to
figure out a real quantum game with similar situation.
The manipulative definition of a quantum game, in the traditional framework which
uses the concepts of strategy according to [4, 3], has been reexpress in [5] as
Γq,o =
(
ρ
q
0
∈ Hq,
N∏
i=1
⊗Hi,L,
{
P i
})
. (11)
Where ρq
0
is the initial state of a quantum object, Hi is player i’s strategy space, L is
a mapping from
∏N
i=1⊗H
i to Hq, the quantum object’s operator space, and P i is the
payoff scale for player i. Now in this game, the quantum object is still chosen as spin,
which has base state vectors |U〉 and |D〉. In matrix form, we denote them as (1, 0)T
and (0, 1)T . We choose
B =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, S =
[
0 1
1 0
]
(12)
as our pure strategies are also the base vectors in player i’s Hilbert space of quantum
strategy. So a general quantum strategy (operator) has the form,
A = xB + yS =
[
x y
y x
]
. (13)
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If we also require it’s a unitary operator, then A†A = I, then x and y are not indepen-
dent. The general form is
U = cos θB + i sin θS =
[
cos θ i sin θ
i sin θ cos θ
]
(14)
The initial state of the quantum object is chosen as
ρ
q
0
=
[
3
4
√
3
4√
3
4
1
4
]
. (15)
Mapping L is just the product U = U2U1. Payoff scale matrix are set as
P 1 =
1
2
[
3ǫ1 − ǫ2 0
0 3ǫ2 − ǫ1
]
= P 2 (16)
Then in this framework, the payoff is defined as
Ei = Tr
(
P iLρq
0
(L)†
)
= Tr
(
P iU2U1ρ
q
0
(
U1
)† (
U2
)†)
. (17)
This is quite similar with the quantum penny flip game[3], which uses different ρq
0
and P i. Using the transformation procedure proposed in [1], we will need other two
quantum pure strategies as base vectors, σy, σz. So we will get a 16× 16-matrix as our
whole payoff matrix. And the sub-matrix related with |B〉 and |S〉 is just the payoff
matrix of our artificial game. So this game should be investigated in the larger space
with the whole payoff matrix, and just because of this, we call our game here as an
artificial game. Since the difficulty to deal with the whole payoff matrix in the larger
space, we wish the discussion of this artificial game still can give us most information.
Of course, if necessary, we can turn to analyze the game with the whole payoff matrix.
However, in this paper, we think , a clear picture is more important than the results of
a full game.
The classical correspondence and its solution —First, we study this game in classical
strategy space, which has the general state as
ρc =
(
p1b |B〉 〈B|+ p
1
s |S〉 〈S|
) (
p2b |B〉 〈B|+ p
2
s |S〉 〈S|
)
, (18)
or in matrix form
ρc =


p1bp
2
b 0 0 0
0 p1bp
2
s 0 0
0 0 p1sp
2
b 0
0 0 0 p1sp
2
s

 . (19)
For such diagonal density matrix, according to the trace operator in equ(3), only the
diagonal term of payoff matrix will effect the payoff value. So payoff matrix of the
classical correspondence of this artificial game is
H1 =


ǫ1 0 0 0
0 ǫ2 0 0
0 0 ǫ2 0
0 0 0 ǫ1

 = H2, or traditionally, G =
[
ǫ1, ǫ1 ǫ2, ǫ2
ǫ2, ǫ2 ǫ1, ǫ1
]
. (20)
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They are similar with Battle of the Sexes (ǫ1 > ǫ2) and Hawk-Dove (ǫ1 < ǫ2). The
solution for a general mixture strategy can be solved by the pseudo-dynamical way
introduced by [1]. The general reduced payoff matrix are
H1R =
[
p2bǫ1 + p
2
sǫ2 0
0 p2bǫ2 + p
2
sǫ1
]
and H2R =
[
p1bǫ1 + p
1
sǫ2 0
0 p1bǫ2 + p
1
sǫ1
]
.
(21)
So the iteration equation given by the pseudo-dynamical equation is
pib =
1
1 + e
βδ
(
1−2p(3−i)
b
) , (22)
in which δ = ǫ1 − ǫ2. The fixed points of this iteration is shown in fig(1).
Solution in quantum pure strategy space — If a general unitary operator as equ(14)
can be used as the strategy of player 1 and player 2, what the equilibrium state? In
order to simplify our discussion, unlike in classical game we deal with both cases of
ǫ1 > ǫ2 and ǫ1 < ǫ2, here we only focus on the former case. A general state of player i
is U i
(
θi
)
in equ(14). Then the reduced payoff matrix when player 2 chooses
∣∣U2 (θ2)〉
is
H1R = Tr1
(
ρ2H1
)
=
[
ǫ1 cos
2 θ2 + ǫ2 sin
2 θ2 i (ǫ1 − ǫ2) cos θ
2 sin θ2
i (ǫ2 − ǫ1) cos θ
2 sin θ2 ǫ2 cos
2 θ2 + ǫ1 sin
2 θ2
]
. (23)
When ǫ1 > ǫ2 the eigen-state with maximum eigenvalue is
E1 = ǫ1, |ǫ1〉 =
(
cos θ2,−i sin θ2
)T
(24)
Compared with equ(14), we know
θ1 = −θ2. (25)
On the other hand, if we solve the inverse question that the solution of player 2 when
player 1’s strategy is fixed at U1
(
θ1
)
, we can get
θ2 = −θ1. (26)
The combination of equ(25) and equ(26), the equilibrium state of this game in quantum
strategy space is(
U1, U2
)
=
(
U1 (θ) , U2 (−θ)
)
,∀θ and
(
E1, E2
)
= (ǫ1, ǫ1) . (27)
Discovering all solutions of a quantum game in quantum mixture strategy space is not
a trivial problem, but will not be a topic of this paper, because here, we just want
to compare these solutions with the entangled strategy solution in next section, not a
general way to calculate all the solutions. Anyway, for this game, since it has many
pure strategy NEs, any mixture combination of all the pure NEs will be mixture NE.
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Figure 1: In figure(a), self-mapping function p1b =
1
1+e
βδ

1−2 1
1+e
βδ(1−2p1b)


for different β
are plotted. For such a mapping, different signs of δ corresponds to the same function.
In figure(b), iteration process
(
p1b =
1
1+e
βδ(1−2p2b)
, p2b =
1
1+e
βδ(1−2p1b)
)
for different β are
plotted. From figure(a), we know that for p1b , 0.5 is always the unstable fixed point
no matter whether δ is positive or not and there are other two stable fixed points
depending on β. In traditional situation[1], under infinite resolution level (β = ∞),
the fixed points are 0 and 1 depending on initial value. From figure(b), much detailed
information can be extracted. In figure(b-1), when δ > 0, (0, 0) and (1, 1) are the
stable fixed points, while in figure(b-2), when δ < 0, they are (0, 1) and (1, 0). So we
can say, besides (0.5, 0.5), when δ > 0, we have two NEs, but when δ < 0, we have
other two NEs. They are just the NEs from traditional analysis, and here they are given
by our pseudo-dynamics process. Furthermore, thinking about the iteration process,
step by step, in some sense, this process can be regarded as an evolution. So even the
pseudo-dynamics process will have a good meaning besides as expected it does end at
the reasonable states — NEs if they are stable. So will it also be a way to Evolutionary
Game from Static Game?
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Entangled quantum game and the GES — Now we try to solve the equilibrium
state in the most wider strategy space, system strategy space, or sometimes, entangled
strategy space, in which a general state can be equ(9). As in [1], we named it as
Entangled Quantum Game because the strategy space permits a state without direct
product relation equ(2). In fact, because in this game, both classical and quantum
game use the same base vectors, it also can be named as Entangled Classical Game
according to the rule we proposed in [1]. The payoff matrix of equ(10) have Global
Equilibrium State (GES). The payoff matrix can be rewritten as
H1 = H2 = ǫ1 (|BB〉+ |SS〉) (〈BB|+ 〈SS|) + ǫ2 (|BS〉+ |SB〉) (〈BS|+ 〈SB|) (28)
So the eigen-state with maximum eigenvalue is |BB〉 + |SS〉 when ǫ1 is bigger and is
|BS〉+ |SB〉 when ǫ2 is bigger. And it’s easy to know they are GES when ǫ1 or ǫ1 is
larger respectively. So the equilibrium state is{
ρSges = |BB〉 〈BB|+ |BB〉 〈SS|+ |SS〉 〈BB|+ |SS〉 〈SS| E
2 = E1 = 2ǫ1 (ǫ1 > ǫ2)
ρSges = |BS〉 〈BS|+ |BS〉 〈SB|+ |SB〉 〈BS|+ |SB〉 〈SB| E
2 = E1 = 2ǫ2 (ǫ1 < ǫ2)
(29)
Both of these states are entangled states between the players. This implies that an
entangled strategy can win over both quantum and classical players. And even more,
since it’s GES,
Ei
(
ρSges
)
> Ei
(
Tr1
(
ρSges
)
Tr2
(
ρSges
))
. (30)
This means when we destroy the correlation between player 1 and player 2, both players
get less payoff. In some sense, this implies that those two players should negotiate and
reach agreement. This is the topic of Cooperative Game. So, could we generally say, if
an entangled state in system space has the property that
Ei
(
ρS
)
> Ei
(
Tr1
(
ρS
)
Tr2
(
ρS
))
,∀i, (31)
it will imply a cooperative behavior?
Discussion — From the results above, we know solution in quantum strategy space
includes solution in classical strategy space as special case, while solution in entangled
strategy space beats quantum solution. At the first sight of the equilibrium entan-
gled strategy, one might regard it as a natural result of the classical correspondence.
Because, in the case of ǫ1 > ǫ2, in some sense, the entangled equilibrium means they
choose to stay together (1
2
(|BB〉+ |SS〉) (〈BB|+ 〈SS|)). But the NEs of the classi-
cal correspondence, equ(20), are |BB〉 〈BB| , |SS〉 〈SS| and 1
2
|BB〉 〈BB|+ 1
2
|SS〉 〈SS|.
They are different with our GES. So it’s totally a new phenomena in entangled game.
However, although it seems correct theoretically, how to experimentally entangle two
operators, not the usual meaning as entanglement of quantum objects? Another ques-
tion is if there is no GES in the game, how to find the equilibrium state defined in
equ(7). In [1], we proposed a pseudo-dynamical iteration process on the basis of Kinet-
ics Equation in Statistical Mechanics, and use it to calculate the equilibrium state of
classical game. It seems work well, although we are still pursuing a general proof. But
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still, we have no applicable algorithm for quantum game. Is it possible to generalize
this approach into quantum game? At last, the same payoff matrix of player 1 and
player 2 makes the classical correspondence of our artificial game not very like a battle,
so it’s exactly a quantized version of Battle of the Sexes and Hawk-Dove Game. This is
also one of the reasons that we call this game and artificial game. Anyway, according to
the manipulative definition of the quantum game Γq,o in equ(11), it still can be realized
by quantum object and operators.
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